Article 356 of the Constitution (President’s Rule) was envisioned by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as a “dead letter” to be invoked only as an extreme last resort. Despite being used over a hundred times prior to the 1990s—frequently to dismiss opposition-ruled state governments—its invocation has declined significantly over the past three decades due to legal and political shifts.

Legal and Judicial Factors Restraining Article 356

• 1. The S.R. Bommai Judgment (1994):
  • The nine-judge Constitution Bench established that the presidential proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review.
  • The Court mandated that the majority of a state government must be tested exclusively on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, rather than assessed through subjective gubernatorial reports.
  • Ruled that the Assembly cannot be dissolved until Parliament approves the proclamation, granting courts the power to restore dismissed state assemblies if the dismissal is found unconstitutional.
• 2. Federalism as Part of the Basic Structure:
  • Affirmed that federalism constitutes an unamendable core feature of the Constitution, constraining central actions that undermine sub-national autonomy.
• 3. Scrutiny of the Governor’s Office (Rameshwar Prasad v. UOI, 2006):
  • The Supreme Court invalidated the dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, ruling that Governors cannot recommend President’s Rule based on subjective assessments of post-poll horse-trading.

Political Factors Restraining Article 356

• 1. The Era of Coalition Governments at the Centre (1989–2014):
  • The decline of single-party dominance required national parties to depend on regional parties (e.g., DMK, AIADMK, TMC, JD(U)) to maintain parliamentary majorities, discouraging arbitrary use of Article 356 against regional allies.
  • The rise of regional parties transformed them into key players in national coalition building.
• 2. Bicameral Checks (Rajya Sabha Composition):
  • Because a proclamation under Article 356 must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months, ruling coalitions lacking a majority in the Rajya Sabha faced legislative hurdles in ratifying emergency orders.
• 3. Constitutional Assertiveness of the President:
  • Presidents exercised constitutional checks under Article 74(1) by returning cabinet recommendations for reconsideration. In 1997 and 1998, President K.R. Narayanan returned cabinet recommendations for President’s Rule in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, preventing executive misuse.
• 4. Institutional Inter-State Forums:
  • Revitalizing the Inter-State Council (Article 263), following the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations, provided a consultation channel to resolve intergovernmental friction without resorting to central rule.

The combination of judicial boundaries set by the Bommai judgment and the political realities of multi-party federalism has aligned Article 356 more closely with its intended role as an exceptional emergency provision.