Under Article 368, Parliament possesses the constituent power to amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation, or repeal. Unlike rigid constitutions that require constituent assemblies or referendums, India entrusts this power to ordinary legislative chambers, while subjecting it to specific procedural hurdles and overarching substantive limitations to preserve the Constitution’s fundamental identity.

Procedural Limitations on the Amending Power

• Sole Initiation in Parliament: Under Article 368(2), a constitutional amendment bill can originate only in either House of Parliament, completely excluding State Legislative Assemblies from introducing amendment proposals.
• Requirement of a Special Majority: The bill must be passed in each House by a special majority: a majority of the total membership of that House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting, precluding simple majoritarian changes.
• Absence of Joint Sitting Mechanism: Unlike ordinary legislation governed under Article 108, Article 368 provides no mechanism for a joint sitting to resolve deadlocks between the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, ensuring the federal upper house holds an absolute veto.
• Mandatory State Ratification for Federal Provisions: Amendments affecting federal provisions (e.g., representation of states in Parliament, the Seventh Schedule legislative lists, the election of the President, and Article 368 itself) require ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by simple majority before presidential assent.
• Mandatory Presidential Assent: Following the 24th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971, the President shall give assent upon receiving a duly passed amendment bill, eliminating presidential veto discretion.

Substantive Limitations on the Amending Power

• The Basic Structure Doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973): The Supreme Court established that Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 is constituent but not unlimited. Parliament cannot alter, damage, or destroy the core foundations or “basic structure” of the Constitution.
• Inviolable Constitutional Pillars: Principles such as secularism, democracy, the republican character, separation of powers, judicial review, and the rule of law are recognized as basic features beyond the reach of parliamentary amendment.
• Judicial Review of Amendments: Constitutional amendments are subject to judicial review under Articles 32 and 136. If an amendment breaches the Basic Structure, the Supreme Court is empowered to declare it null and void (e.g., striking down the 99th Amendment regarding the NJAC in 2015).
• The Limited Amending Power Doctrine: In Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), the apex court held that a limited amending power is itself a basic feature of the Constitution; Parliament cannot use Article 368 to expand its amending power into an absolute authority to alter the Constitution’s foundations.

India’s constitutional design balances flexibility with institutional stability. While procedural hurdles ensure broad legislative consensus, the Basic Structure doctrine ensures Parliament amends within the boundaries of the Constitution rather than abrogating its core values.